



26 May 1969

NOTE FOR: Mr. Bannerman

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The one CT separation in the Support Services during the first quarter of CY 1969 involves the resignation of [ ] from the Support Services Staff. He was the only one to note disillusionment and frustration with respect to his assignment.

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In your absence, and rather than write a memo to [ ] I discussed the information that you would like to have concerning this case with [ ]. He will be attending the Records Management Conference in Ocean City but will make an appointment to discuss the case with you on or about 2 June 1969.

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I am attaching two papers dealing with the [ ] case for your information.

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/s/ OK - RB.  
28 May 69



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69-0609

FILE

4 February 1969

Training 3-1

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT : The Future of CIA: The Young Professional

1. Note of Explanation: I have resigned from the Agency to accept a position in private industry. At every stage of out-processing, I have been asked to write about what leads the young professional to such a decision. It is difficult to be completely objective and I am sure that the circumstances leading to my decision are unique. In hopes that my thoughts may someday help others, I have attempted to assess those factors which were paramount in my particular case. I am now, as I was in 1966, dedicated to the mission and ideals of this Agency, and should this paper survive middle management burn bags, I do hope it will contribute to a realistic appraisal of CIA's approach to its future. These comments are purposely general. If management has a sincere interest they will seek specifics. I have left a forwarding address and will make time to be of future assistance.

2. It is impossible to make a general statement as to what leads the young CIA professional to resign. Every case must be considered separately. However, there are three basic frustrations which I have encountered and may be fairly common. The three constants, simply stated, are: misrepresentation, miscalculation and miserable assessment of available resources. In the Agency these three represent a lack of (1) meaningful work, (2) money and (3) management at operating levels. What follows is some expansion upon these generalizations as they affected me and may be affecting others.

3. The realistic junior military officer does not expect to make command decisions at the division or headquarters level. The realistic CIA junior professional does not anticipate policy responsibility. However, we expect work which will tax our training, background, interests and intelligence. The lawyer should not be expected to perform filing duties. The MBA should not have to grope within the transactions and records section of an office.

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The area specialist, with any degree, should not have to serve as a grammar specialist before performing meaningful research. The young case officer should not have to wait for an overseas opening in any area, that no experienced operations officer wants. These are realistic facts of life, not misconceptions.

4. Employment opportunities at CIA are misrepresented. Initially the CT is told that he is the "elite", the "future manager" of the Agency. Once on board the new professional is told without Agency experience he cannot perform many of the tasks outlined by the recruiter. This may very well be the case, but no active effort is being made to give this ambitious individual the chance to achieve his experience and then move upwards. The fault here is two-fold. First, recruiters must tell it like it is. Second, those responsible for career development should assimilate meaningful tasks for young careerists. These tasks must demonstrate to the CT or other employee that he is making a contribution to the Agency mission. One point that cannot be emphasized enough is that both recruiters and CT officers must tell the truth. Rather say black and mean it than say white then change it to black two years later. The treatment accorded military CTs is a striking example of what misrepresentation can do for esprit de corps.

5. Young people realize that they are making a financial sacrifice when they accept government employment. Therefore, money as a single factor cannot be regarded as significant in leading towards resignation. Coupled with one or two other frustrations, however, financial remuneration can easily become the straw which breaks the camel's back, such was true in my case. The trained lawyer, performing clerk's tasks is literally driven to look elsewhere when offered a GS-8 or 9. The MBA can draw approximately \$4,000 a year more in private industry and is driven in that direction when promised a GS-10, then given a GS-9. CT officers retort that "it all evens out." I am sorry to say that they are fooling only themselves, it never evens out. In a profit motivated environment the young professional need not wait for head room or slots. Government promotion policies stifle for merit and promotes for longevity. Referring again to the military CT, is it realistic to ask us to accept a cut in pay from the armed forces? I know that it is not, yet the CT officer has yet to be equitable with returning career trainees. If this assessment leads to the abolishment of the military program, so be it. As it operates in 1969, the program is

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ineffective, inequitable and benefits nobody in the end if we are forced to leave.

6. The Agency has matured to a full-fledged bureaucracy and has suffered from mis-management perils which always accompany obesity. Mr. Helms was prophetically accurate in September 1968. New ideas for change and improvement are resented by managers who rely on the tired and true. In most instances these are the middle managers whose careers have ebbed. The CT office, as one striking example, is afraid of its shadow and has done standing-pat one better; they are managing to move backwards as program managers. Young people do not ask superiors to risk their jobs. We ask only that management stick their necks out just far enough to listen. Give us the opportunity to be heard. If our inexperience is obvious show us where; tell us why and how.

7. A greek philosopher has said that man does not learn with his mouth open. The young professional coming to CIA is better educated, more highly motivated and probably more dedicated than his predecessors. We demand no more than you did when the Agency was young. A concerted effort by top management will eliminate the need of memorandums such as this. I feel that top management must educate middle management before middle management can approach the new professional.

8. If past experience holds, the CT office will ascribe my motivation to insufficient credentials. We know that they say of us that "he could not have made it in the Agency, anyhow." The young people I have become associated with while with CIA are an exceptional group. Yet, like any cross section we are not beyond reproach as recruiters would have us think. I implore you to take immediate steps to hold onto the talent which you have. The potential of this Agency is in the hands of the young professionals of today and the manner in which management approaches their careers will determine the future of CIA.



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cc: Inspector General  
Deputy Director for Support  
Chief, Support Services Staff  
Chief, Office of Personnel  
Chief, Career Training Program

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6 January 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

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SUBJECT: [REDACTED]

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1. [REDACTED] is a military Support CT who is scheduled to civilianize on 5 January 1969. Upon his graduation from the Support CT course last July, he opted for the Personnel Career Service and has been assigned to

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[REDACTED] Staff as a detailee from Personnel. He is an operations research type and according to [REDACTED] has been performing very well.

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[REDACTED] does not intend to remain long with us, however, because he is dissatisfied with the grade (GS-09) offered.

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2. The CTP policy for civilianization grade of military CT's is based on the CT training class that the military detailee joins upon his return to the Agency. When the class is promoted upon completion of training, the military CT is given a paper promotion which permits him to civilianize with four to six months in grade. Then when the class is given its second promotion, usually ten to twelve months after the first, the civilianized military CT is promoted along with this class, assuming good training performance. In [REDACTED] case he EOD'd as a GS-03, was given a paper promotion to GS-09 in September 1968; this means he will be eligible for promotion to GS-10 next July. Exceptions to this policy are made for military CT's who achieve an outstanding training performance.

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3. Unfortunately when [REDACTED] inquired about his civilianization grade, the CTP mistakenly told him it would be GS-10. They corrected their error very quickly, but the damage had been done. Apparently the error was caused by CTP confusion over what [REDACTED] EOD grade should have been.

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- 2 -

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4. [ ] told the CTP that a GS-09 was unacceptable and negotiated aggressively but unsuccessfully to get a 10. He no doubt rightly claimed he could get an operations research job on the outside for \$1000 more than even a GS-10. In negotiations [ ] also stated that the DDS promotion policy for CT's was only six months time in grade and he could expect a GS-10 very shortly. This is not the DDS policy; our policy goes along with the CTP schedule. I clarified this immediately with [ ]

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5. I checked with the CTP on the possibility of [ ] getting a GS-10 on the basis of his good performance with [ ] his academic background in operations research. CTP told me that there were eight military CT's civilianizing at the same time and of the eight he would rate possibly seventh based on his training performance. They did not feel it would be a wise precedent to make an exception in his case because of the impact on his peers.

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6. While discussing [ ] work with him a few weeks ago, his civilianization grade problem was surfaced. I told [ ] about my checking with the CTP and their reaction. He indicated that a GS-09 was unacceptable and that he would probably seek employment on the outside. He is now in touch with our out-placement people.

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7. [ ] is an aggressive young man, somewhat immature but obviously has high potential. He apparently antagonized CTP program officers by his attitude and was unable to sell them on the desirability of civilianizing him at GS-10. In any event, I think the essential problem is that military detailees do not understand clearly what grade they can expect upon civilianization and when their next promotion will occur. I suggested to the CTP that it is critical to communicate to military CT's upon their return to the Agency the civilianization grade and promotion policy.

151

[ ]  
Support Operations Staff/DDS

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